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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HOWARD W. BRANDT and LEONA 
J. BRANDT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
SPRINGVILLE B A N K I N G COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, F. C. 
PACKARD and HOWARD C. MAY-
COCK, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9128 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMEI~T 
As in Appellants' brief, the parties will be referred to 
as in the Court below. 
Plaintiffs have appealed from a Summary Judgment 
granted to Defendants by the Honorable Maurice Harding, 
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District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court pur-
suant to a Memorandum Decision dated the 16th day of 
July, 1959. 
This is the second lawsuit commenced by the Plaintiffs 
In an effort to obtain a judgment based upon the facts 
involved herein (R. 41). 
The Statement of Facts presented by Plaintiffs in their 
brief is misleading in many respects, inconsistent with 
the record herein and while some of the facts and inuendos 
must be deemed admitted for purposes of this appeal they 
are vigorously denied by the Defendants. The attention of 
this Court is directed to the record filed herein and par-
ticularly the pleadings, for a correct statement of the facts 
involved on this appeal. 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on February 24, 1959 
which purports to allege a cause of action for fraud against 
Defendants for their alleged failure to disclose the existence 
of a chattel mortgage in connection with a transaction in 
which Plaintiffs were involved (R. 3). This transaction 
referred to took place in February and March of 1955. 
Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim in which 
they set forth as a defense, among others, the Statute of 
Limitations (R. 9). Plaintiffs thereafter amended their 
complaint to allege that the existence of the alleged fraud 
was not discovered by them until 1958 (R. 21). 
Defendants then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon two grounds: ( 1) that the cause of action al-
leged by Plaintiffs was barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions because Plaintiffs had constructive notice of the 
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chattel mortgage by virtue of the filing of said chattel 
mortgage with the County Recorder; and (2) that as a 
matter of law, under all of the facts shown by the pleadings 
and by Plaintiffs own allegations the damages alleged by 
the Plaintiffs were not proximately caused by the alleged 
concealment by the Defendants, since the chattel mortgage 
did not cause any dama.ge or loss to them (R. 27). This 
motion was based upon an affidavit by one of the defen-
dants which remains uncontroverted despite a lengthy and 
rambling affidavit prepared by Plaintiffs' attorney (R. 
29). The latter affidavit is filled with allegations, conclu-
sions of law and inuendos which although denied by the 
Defendants still does not alter the facts upon which De-
fendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this appeal certain of Plaintiffs' alle-
gations of facts must be assumed to be correct even though 
they are denied by Defendants. 
During the early part of 1955, Plaintiffs started to 
negotiate with Waldo W. Jackson, brother of Leona J .. 
Brandt, one of the Plaintiffs and brother-in-law of Howard 
J. Brandt, the other Plaintiff. Plaintiffs discussed with 
Mr. Jackson a proposal by which they would invest money 
in a new hardware and farm implement business to be 
organized by them. These negotiations were in no way in-
itiated by the Defendant bank or its officers. The new 
corporation organized by Plaintiffs. and Mr. Jackson was 
known as Stockman & Farmers Mart. This corporation was 
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to acquire part of the hardware and farm implement in-
ventory and certain equipment owned by Jackson Sales & 
Service Company, a corporation controlled by Mr. Jackson. 
The Defendant bank and its officers assisted Plain-
tiffs in borrowing the $10,000.00 which they were to invest 
in the new corporation. On March 2, 1955 the transaction 
was closed in the Defendant bank and Plaintiffs and their 
brother (or brother-in-law) deposited checks representing 
their investment to the account of the new corporation and 
a check was drawn by the new corporation to Jackson Sales 
& Service Company to pay for the inventory and equipment 
being transferred. The Defendant bank also loaned the 
new corporation some money upon the personal guarantee 
of the Plaintiffs. 
On the date of the above transaction the Defendant, 
Springville Banking Company, held a note of Jackson Sales 
& Service Company, dated September 19, 1949, the unpaid 
balance of which on March 2, 1955 was $40,194.79. This 
note was secured by a real estate mortgage on considerable 
real property owned by said corporation in Springville, 
Utah and a chattel mortgage dated September 19, 1949, 
covering certain personal property (R. 29). This chattel 
mortgage was filed with the County Recorder of Utah 
County on September 24, 1949 as Entry No. 8708. It is 
alleged that this chattel mortgage covered part of the per-
sonal property transferred by Jackson Sales & Service 
Company to Stockman & Farmers Mart and for purposes 
of this appeal this allegation is admitted. There is no al-
legation in Plaintiffs' complaint and there is no factual 
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basis for Plaintiffs' statement in their brief that the $10,-
000.00 paid by Plaintiffs to the new corporation, of which 
Plaintiffs were President and Vice-President, was used 
to apply on the chattel mortgage indebtedness. 
It is alleged that at the time of the above transaction 
in the Defendant bank in March of 1955 Defendants did 
not disclose to Plaintiffs the existence of the above chattel 
mortgage dated September 19, 1949. 
As shown by the affidavit of defendant Howard C. 
Maycock, Cashier of the Springville Banking Company, the 
note secured by the real estate and chattel mortgage was 
later paid and discharged by Jackson Sales & Service Com-
pany or WaldoW. Jackson (R. 29). This was done by the 
conveyance to the bank of part or all of the real estate cov-
ered by the mortgage. The chattel mortgage was never 
foreclosed and the property described in the chattel mort-
gage was never attached by the bank or in any way affected 
by said chattel mortgage (R. 29). The said Stockmen & 
Farmers Mart and the Plaintiffs herein did not sustain any 
loss as a result of the existence of said chattel mortgage. 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery as set forth in their 
Amended Complaint was based upon the allegation in Para-
graph 10 "that as a proximate result of said Chattel Mort-
gage and the concealment thereof by Defendants, plaintiffs 
lost said $10,000.00 when said business of Stockman & 
Farmers Mart failed." (Emphasis added.) (R. 23.) As 
stated in this allegation, Plaintiffs' damages, if any, re-
sulted from the failure of the business, not from the ex-
istence of the chattel mortgage. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT SINCE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
UNDER THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
THE ALLEGED FRAUD OR CONCEALMENT 
DID NOT PROXIMATELY CAUSE PLAIN-
TIFFS' ALLEGED DAMAGES. 
A. PLAINTIFFS ARE BOUND BY THE AL-
LEGATIONS OF THEIR COMPLAINT. 
B. THE ALLEGED CONCEALMENT OF THE 
CHATTEL MORTGAGE WAS NOT THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' 
ALLEGED DAMAGES. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED 
AS A MATTER OF LAW BY THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS AS SET FORTH IN SEC-
TION 78-12-26, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, SINCE PLAINTIFFS HAD CONSTRUC-
TIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF 
THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT SINCE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
UNDER THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
THE ALLEGED FRAUD OR CONCEALMENT 
DID NOT PROXIMATELY CAUSE PLAIN-
TIFFS' ALLEGED DAMAGES. 
Despite all of the allegations which Plaintiffs attempted 
to set forth in their affidavit, the fact remains that the 
single issue raised by Plaintiffs.' complaint is the alleged 
failure of the Defendants to disclose the existence of a 
chattel mortgage, executed 6 years before, that might have 
affected personal property being transferred to a corpora-
tion Plaintiffs helped organize. It is. undisputed that this 
chattel mortgage was incidental to a real estate mortgage 
and that the note secured by said mortgage was, subse-
quently discharged without any loss to the Stockmen & 
Farmers Mart or to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs even admit 
that their loss of investment resulted from the failure of 
the business. 
A. PLAINTIFFS ARE BOUND BY THE AL-
LEGATIONS OF THEIR COMPLAINT. 
For purposes of the Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment the allegations of the Amended Complaint must 
be deemed admitted. Plaintiffs cannot seek to vary or alter 
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the allegations of their Complaint. They cannot seek to 
set forth new causes of action by affidavit. 
Under Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and the undis-
puted facts, there is no genuine issue of fact on the ques-
tion of causation. 
It is clear that for purposes of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment the Court must accept the allegations. of the 
Complaint as true. Iverson v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 
1001 (D. C. 1946) ; Downey v. Banker, 32 F. Supp. 874 (S. 
D. N. Y. 1940). 
The District Court was therefore justified in relying 
upon Plaintiffs' own allegations in granting the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
B. THE ALLEGED CONCEALMENT OF THE 
CHATTEL MORTGAGE WAS NOT THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' 
ALLEGED DAMAGES. 
The alleged concealment of the chattel mortgage was 
not the proximate cause of any damage to the Plaintiffs. 
In order to make out a case for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion a plaintiff must prove actual damage. 
It is evidently plaintiffs' reasoning that had they 
known of the existence of the mortgage they would not 
have gone into this business and if they had not gone into 
the business they would not have lost their money when 
the business failed. This is not sufficient proximate cause. 
By the same reasoning they could contend that if they were 
injured while working for the business or if the building 
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burned down causing them loss that the Defendants would 
be responsible. 
The Restatement of Torts summarizes the law on this 
question. Section 549, covering the measure of damages 
for fraudulent misrepresentation, states that "The measure 
of damages which the recipient of a fraudulent misrepre-
sentation is entitled to recover from its maker as damages 
under the rule stated in Section 525 is the pecuniary loss 
which results from the falsity of the matter misrepresented 
* * *" The comment under this Section states: 
"Under the rule stated in this clause the recip-
ient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to 
recover from its maker only the actual loss which 
because of its falsity he sustains by his action or 
inaction in reliance upon it." 
It must then be the falsity of the matter misrepresented 
that causes the loss. On page 112 of Volume 3 of the Re-
statement of Torts the following further statement is made : 
"One who, having acquired securities, retains 
them in reliance upon anothers fraudulent repre-
sentation is not entitled to recover from him a loss 
in value of the securities which is in no way due to 
the falsity of the representation but is caused by 
some other subsequent event which has, no connec-
tion with or relation thereto." 
The plaintiffs in this case claim their stock in the 
Stockman & Farmers Mart became worthless and they 
therefore lost their investment. Under their allegations, 
this may well have been the case, but the loss. did not result 
from the alleged misrepresentations of the Defendants. 
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A great portion of the legal argument of Appellants' 
brief is devoted to extensive quotations from Prosser on 
Torts.. In Section 90, Page 769, (1st Edition) this author 
discusses the question of causation in a deceit action: 
"Furthermore, the damage upon which a deceit 
action rests must have been 'proximately caused' by 
the misrepresentation. So far as the fact of causa-
tion is concerned, any loss which follows upon a 
transaction into which the misstatement induces the 
plaintiff to enter may be said to be caused by it; 
but the same considerations which limit liability in 
cases of tangible harm have operated here. In gen-
eral, with only a few exceptions, the courts have 
restricted recovery to those damages which might 
forseeably be expected to follow from the character 
of the misrepresentation. Thus, if false statements 
are made in connection with the sale of corporate 
stock, a subsequent decline of the market or insolv-
ency of the corporation will not afford a basis for 
recovery, unless the fact misstated was of a nature 
calculated to bring about such a result. Often this 
is expressed by saying that the representation is 
'immaterial' in such a case; but the conclusion is 
reached even though the plaintiff has relied, and 
justifiably so, upon what he has been told." 
The following cases also illustrate the principle that 
the damages must proximately result from the fraudulent 
statement or concealment; Morrell v. Wiley, 119 Conn. 578, 
178 Atl. 121; Beare v. Wright, 14 N. D. 26, 103 N. W. 632; 
Morgan v. Hodge, 145 Wis. 143, 129 N. W. 1083; Hindman 
v. First National Bank, 112 Fed. 931 (6th Cir. 1902); 
Hotling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870; 
Haentz v. Loehr, 233 Wis. 583, 290 N. W. 163. 
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In the AI o1·rell case, cited above, the Court said: 
"* * * the damages are measured by the 
difference between the actual value of the property 
received and its value had it been as represented." 
In the Beare case, the Court said: 
"Respondent asserts that he was inveigled into 
the speculation by the deceit of the appellants and, 
therefore, the false repres·entations are the proxi-
mate cause of the loss he has suffered. The argu-
ment is more plausible than sound." 
"The measure of damages in such cases is the 
difference between the value of the property as it 
actually was and its. value as it would have been if 
it were such as represented to be in those particulars 
in relation to which the false and fraudulent repre-
sentations were made." 
It is a fundamental rule that in order to maintain a 
suit for fraud or deceit, some damage must be proved. In 
23 American Juris prudence, Section 172, Page 985, it says: 
"It is a fundamental principle of law that with 
the exception of special cases recognized only in 
some jurisdictions, in order to secure relief on a 
basis of fraud either in law or equity, the person 
seeking redress must be damaged, injured or harmed 
as a result of an asserted fraud." 
In Section 176, the following statement is made: 
"To sustain an action for deceit, the fraud and 
injury must be connected and must bear to each 
other the relation of cause and effect." 
In the case of Kosmos Portland Cement Co. v. D. A. Y. 
Const1·uction Co., 101 F. 2d 893, 896, (7th Cir. 1939) the 
following statement appears : 
"It is a rule of universal application that to 
constitute an actionable fraud, it must appear that 
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the complaining party has been in some way dam-
aged or prejudiced. * * * The fraud and in-
jury must be connected and bear to the other the 
relation of cause and effect; the damage must flow 
from the fraud as the proximate and not the remote 
cause.'' 
In the case of Man by v. Hibbard, 71 Colo. 296, 206 Pac. 
381, the Court said : 
"It is elementary that the damages recoverable 
are those which result directly and proximately from 
the deceit complained of." 
The Plaintiffs by their complaint have alleged the 
existence of fraud by concealment and they have also al-
leged that they sustained damages by the loss of their in-
vestment when the business venture failed. They have 
failed to allege, however, and under the undisputed facts 
they cannot prove that the alleged fraud was the proximate 
cause of their damages. While, for purposes. of argument, 
it might be said that they would not have made the invest-
ment had they known of this chattel mortgage, the fact 
remains that the chattel mortgage did not cause the loss 
of which they complain. 
We have found no Utah case S·pecifically dealing with 
the issue of causation in a deceit action but the law as 
quoted above from the Restatement of Torts is unanimously 
accepted. It must be the falsity of the fact misrepresented 
that causes the loss to the recipient. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED 
AS A MATTER OF LAW BY THE STATUTE 
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OF LIMITATIONS AS SET FORTH IN SEC-
TION 78-12-26, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, SINCE PLAINTIFFS HAD CONSTRUC-
TIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF 
THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE. 
As noted, the trial court relied upon the argument and 
legal reasoning set forth in Point I in granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Equally valid, however, is 
the first ground set forth in the Motion for Summary Judg-
ment (R. 27). 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint purports. to state a 
cause of action based upon the alleged concealment of the 
existence of a chattel mortgage dated September 19, 1949 
given by Jackson Sales & Service Company to Defendant 
Springville Banking Company. The concealment of this 
fact was alleged to have taken place in March of 1955. This 
lawsuit was not commenced within three years after the 
date of the alleged fraud. Plaintiffs amended their original 
complaint, however, to allege that the fraud was not dis-
covered until June of 1958. The chattel mortgage involved 
was filed of record in the office of the Utah County Re-
corder in September of 1949 and was on file at the time of 
the alleged fraud. 
Section 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
for a 3-year statute of limitations on "an action for relief 
on the ground of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action 
in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting 
the fraud or mistake." 
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Our Supreme Court has clearly held that the discovery 
of the fraud does not require actual notice of the facts and 
that a person is deemed to have discovered the existence of 
the fraud if he has the means of obtaining the information 
or has knowledge which would lead a reasonable person to 
discover the facts. 
In Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 Pac. 
684, at page 690, the Court said: 
"If a mistake occurred therefore, as alleged, he 
at least had all the means in his possession of ascer-
taining that fact and hence must be deemed to have 
known of the alleged mistake, under such circum-
stances our statute of limitations which was pleaded 
as a defense to the cause of action in question consti-
tutes a complete bar." 
The Court then cited the case of Weight v. Bailey, 45 
Utah 584, 14 7 Pac. 899 and stated: 
"We there held that where the facts constituting 
the alleged fraud or mistake are known, or where 
circumstances are as in this case, that is, if facts 
should have been known to the complaining party, 
he cannot successfully maintain an action. * * *" 
Certainly the Plaintiffs in this case had the means of 
discovering the alleged fraud at the time of the transaction. 
An examination of the county records 'vould have disclosed 
the existence of the mortgage. 
This Court has stated that where an instrument is re-
corded all persons are deemed to have knowledge of this 
fact. In Smith v. EduJa?'·ds, 81 Utah 244, 17 P. 2d 264, 269, 
involving a real estate mortgage, the Court said: 
"From the time of recording these conveyances 
all persons, including plaintiffs, notice was imparted 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
to them that the conveyances contained the state-
ments above quoted. That the plaintiff and all other 
persons had notice that such conveyances. had been 
made and recorded seems to go without saying, for 
surely, if one is charged with notice of the contents, 
he must be charged with notice of the existence of 
the document itself." 
With reference to a chattel mortgage the Supreme 
Court in Bonneville Lumber Co. v. Peppard Seed Co., 72 
Utah 463, 271 Pac. 226, said: 
"The mortgage, as executed and ,recorded, was 
unquestionably constructive notice to the defendant 
and all the world of the existence of a chattel mort-
gage valid on its face." 
Plaintiffs cite the case of Smith v. Edwards, supra, in 
which the Court said "Mere constructive notice of the deed 
by reason of its being filed for record is not notice of the 
facts constituting the fraud." In the present case it is the 
mere existence of the mortgage that is in issue, not the 
existence of any fraud surrounding the execution of the 
mortgage. Certainly the Court did not intend by the above 
language to hold that the parties were not charged with 
knowledge as to the existence of the deed. 
The courts have made a distinction between this type 
of case where a failure to disclose the existence of a re-
corded instrument is. involved and the cases where the de-
fendant affirmatively tells the plaintiff that there are no 
encumbrances. In the latter situation the courts in some 
states have held that the plaintiff is excused from exam-
ining the records. In the present case, however, no con ten-
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tion is made that the defendants made any oral misrepre-
sentations or that they discouraged plaintiffs from search-
ing the county records. 
A conclusion such as the plaintiffs and appellants seek 
to reach would nullify the purpose of our recording statutes 
in imparting constructive notice of the instrument filed 
of record. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly granted Defendants.' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Memorandum Decision 
of Judge Harding in which he states : "There is no allega-
tion or showing of any kind as to the cause of the failure 
and whether the failure had any connection with the undis-
closed indebtedness or chattel mortgage" is fully supported 
by the record. It is also conclusively shown that as a matter 
of law the cause of action alleged by plaintiffs is barred 
by the Statute of Limitations. The summary judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
David E. Salisbury, 
AttoTneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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